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MILITANT ISLAMICIST TERRORISM IN 
EUROPE: ARE FRANCE & THE UNITED 
KINGDOM LEGALLY PREPARED FOR THE 
CHALLENGE? 
W. JASON FISHER∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
The London bombings in 2005, the ritual murder of Dutch filmmaker 
Theo Van Gogh in 2004, and the Madrid train bombings that same year 
highlight how the terrorist activities of militant Islamicists have effected 
Europe in recent years. Since 2001, police and intelligence services have 
foiled over thirty plots to conduct similar terrorist actions across Europe, 
several in the last eighteen months.1 In addition to perpetrating attacks in 
Europe, militant Islamicists with ties to Europe have attempted and carried 
out acts of terror in other parts of the world. For example, Ahmed Ressam, 
the Algerian convicted for his involvement in the LAX/Millennium Plot, 
was radicalized in Milan, the leaders of the September 11, 2001, attacks on 
the United States (9/11) were introduced in Hamburg, and Omar Sheik, 
 
 
 ∗ Judicial Clerk to the Honorable James O. Browning, United States District Court for the 
District of New Mexico; J.D./M.A. University of California, Berkeley, 2006. I am grateful to Professor 
Mayali for his counsel and direction. I would also like to thank Elena Rodriguez for her assistance and 
support.  
 1. For example, in October 2005, seven Muslim men were arrested “in Denmark in connection 
with an alleged terrorist plot involving suicide vests in Bosnia . . . .” In April 2005, several members of 
the Hofstad Network were arrested in the Netherlands and accused of planning to assassinate a series 
of Dutch politicians and attack the Netherlands’ only nuclear reactor and Schiphol Airport. In October 
2004, approximately thirty North African men were detained in connection with a plot to attack 
Spain’s National Court “with a truck loaded with a half-ton of dynamite . . . .” In April 2004, Belgian 
federal police prevented attacks planned against a Jewish school and the inauguration of a high-speed 
train tunnel, both in Antwerp. In March 2004, eight British citizens thought to be of Pakistani descent 
were found with half a ton of fertilizer used in bomb-making. Five were arrested and face terrorism 
charges, and three were charged with possession of a half-ton of ammonium nitrate. In March 2003, 
nine North African residents of the United Kingdom were arrested for preparing ricin for use in a 
terrorist plot and were charged with producing chemical weapons. Islamic Extremism in Europe: 
Statement Before the S. Foreign Relations Comm., Subcomm. on European Affairs, 109th Cong. 3 
(2006) [hereinafter Islamic Extremism in Europe] (statement of Robin Niblett, Executive Vice 
President and Director, Europe Program, the Center for Strategic and International Studies); Zachary 
K. Johnson, Chronology: The Plots, FRONTLINE, Nov. 8, 2006, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ 
frontline/shows/front/special/cron.html.  
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who took part in the kidnapping and murder of Wall Street Journal 
Reporter Danny Pearl, was born in the United Kingdom.2  
The above examples are not to suggest that Europe’s Muslim 
population at large is a terrorist threat. Undoubtedly, most of Europe’s 
Muslims are peaceable, law-abiding citizens. Nor is it suggested that 
terrorism is new to Europe. Europe has confronted several waves of 
terrorism, including those associated with nationalism, anarchism, and the 
radical left. However, Europe is facing a small but powerful minority in 
militant Islamicism, one with unique grievances and aims that has 
demonstrated a willingness to kill on a considerable scale.  
France’s domestic intelligence service, les Renseignements Generaux, 
has attempted to create a formula to measure the number of 
fundamentalists and estimates that, based on France’s Muslim population 
of six million, there are approximately 9,000 potentially dangerous 
militant Islamicists.3 While a satisfactory treatment of the many specific 
and varied grievances and goals of militant Islamicists is beyond the scope 
of this article, it will suffice here to note that militant Islamicists generally 
blame what they perceive as Western imperialism for the subjugation, 
oppression, and ills of Muslims throughout the world and that they are 
willing to use force in attempting to end Western interference.4 The 
terrorist attacks militant Islamicists undertake tend to be more physically 
destructive—both in terms of harm to property and individuals—than 
previous acts of terrorism carried out in Europe. European terrorist 
casualty ratios (the number of those injured and killed in a terrorist attack 
divided by the total number of terrorist attacks) have significantly 
increased with the emergence of militant Islamicist terrorism. For 
example, the 1970s produced an average casualty per incident rate of 4.47, 
the 1980s 4.87, the 1990s 12.29, and the period 2000–2003 14.49.5 
Militant Islamicist terror groups tend to be operationally autonomous 
but ideologically affiliated. This has led to the development across Europe 
 
 
 2. Islamic Extremism in Europe: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Europe and Emerging 
Threats of the H. Comm. on International Relations, 109th Cong. 6–7 (2005) [hereinafter Islamic 
Extremism Hearing] (statement of Peter Bergen, Fellow, The America Foundation).  
 3. See id. at 33–34 (statement of Claude Moniquet, President and Director General, European 
Strategic Intelligence and Security Center); Robert S. Leiken, Europe’s Angry Muslims, 84-4 FOREIGN 
AFF. 120, 122 (2005).  
 4. For a detailed discussion of the grievances, beliefs, and goals of militant Islamicists, see 
generally DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEVEN SIMON, THE AGE OF SACRED TERROR: RADICAL ISLAM’S 
WAR AGAINST AMERICA (2003); JOHN L. ESPOSITO, UNHOLY WAR: TERROR IN THE NAME OF ISLAM 
(2002).  
 5. Robert S. Leiken, Europe’s Mujahideen: Where Mass Immigration Meets Global Terrorism, 
CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES: BACKGROUNDER 4 (Apr. 2005), available at http://www.cis.org/ 
articles/2005/back405.pdf.  
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of a loosely associated militant Islamicist network that shares knowledge 
and resources. That nature, moreover, has afforded militant Islamicists, 
whether citizens, foreign residents, or illegal immigrants, a certain degree 
of cover in Europe’s highly concentrated suburban Muslim enclaves. From 
there, it is feared, militant Islamicists may be able to expand their social 
base by attracting marginalized and alienated European-born Muslim 
youths, young persons who feel trapped in the high unemployment, low-
income environment of the enclaves or as non-integrated members of the 
wider societies in which they live, or both.6 Some evidence suggests that 
that is already happening and in a manner that spans the socio-economic 
spectrum. In 2003, a network that recruited hundreds of young enclave 
Muslims from Germany, France, Sweden, Italy, and the Netherlands for 
training with militant Islamicists fighting in Iraq was discovered and 
dismantled.7 Two of the perpetrators of the 2005 London bombings were 
British-born, university-educated Muslims, one from an upper-middle 
class background,8 and Omar Sheik was born in the United Kingdom to a 
wealthy family and graduated from the London School of Economics.9 
The involvement of young Muslim European citizens expands the scope of 
the militant Islamicist terrorist threat as they may take advantage of their 
familiarity with modern western society and ability to travel quite freely to 
many parts of the world to conduct terrorist activities. For example, both 
Zacarias Moussaoui, the infamous “twentieth hijacker,” and Richard Reid, 
the “shoe bomber,” French and British citizens respectively, were able to 
secure entry into the United States without visas through the US-EU Visa 
Waiver Program.10  
 
 
 6. Overall, residents of suburban Muslim enclaves suffer more crime, earn less income, achieve 
lower levels of educational attainment, and experience higher levels of unemployment—nearly forty 
percent—than is typical of the members of the wider state societies in which they live. Humayun 
Ansari, The Legal Status of Muslims in the UK, in THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF MUSLIMS IN EUROPE 
255, 257 (Roberta Aluffi & Giovanna Zincone eds., 2004); John Carreyou, Muslim Groups May Gain 
Strength From French Riots, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 2005, at A1, A15; John Carreyou, The Shame of the 
Cités: French Unrest Finds a Home in Projects, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2005, at A1, A14; see also 
Islamic Extremism Hearing, supra note 3, at 34–35 (statement of Claude Moniquet); Islamic 
Extremeism in Europe, supra note 1, at 4–5 (statement of Robin Niblett); ROBERT J. PAULY, JR., 
ISLAM IN EUROPE: INTEGRATION OR MARGINALIZATION? 39 (2004).  
 7. See Islamic Extremism Hearing, supra note 2, at 30 (prepared statement of Lorenzo Vidino, 
Deputy Director, the Investigative Project); see generally Leiken, supra note 3, at 128–29.  
 8. See Sandra Laville & Dilpazier Aslam, Mentor to the Young and Vulnerable, GUARDIAN, 
July 14, 2005, at 3, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/attackonlondon/story/0,16132,1528112,00. 
html; Sandra Laville & Ian Cobain, From Cricket-Lover Who Enjoyed a Laugh to Terror Suspect, 
GUARDIAN, July 13, 2005, at 1, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/attackonlondon/story/0,16132, 
1527429,00.html.  
 9. Islamic Extremism Hearing, supra note 2, at 7 (statement of Peter Bergen); id. at 26–28 
(prepared statement of Lorenzo Vidino).  
 10. Leiken, supra note 3, at 134.  
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As the foregoing indicates, it is crucial that European states have legal 
regimes in place that will allow them to counter terrorism and, in 
particular, militant Islamicist terrorism, actively and effectively. That said, 
it is imperative that any such counter-terrorism laws strike a balance 
between national security and the principles of liberal democratic freedom. 
However, achieving that balance can be difficult, considering the freedom 
and openness that characterizes liberal democratic states is often what 
places them at increased risk of terrorist attack. With a primary objective 
of securing the physical safety of their citizens, the tendency of liberal 
democratic states is to respond to terrorist “shocks” immediately, visibly, 
and usually before understanding the true nature of the threat that they 
face. This type of response further complicates the reaching of a balance 
between security and freedom.11 Moreover, it is especially important that 
European states with large minority Muslim populations, such as France, 
the Netherlands, Germany, and the United Kingdom, establish and 
implement counter-terrorism laws in a fashion that Muslims perceive as 
balanced and fair.12 Otherwise, those states may face backlashes from 
discontented Muslim minorities. European states must also take care not to 
add to any racist or anti-immigrant sentiments with how they design and 
apply their counter-terrorism laws. 
This Article seeks to take a first step in advancing the development of 
effective and balanced comprehensive counter-terrorism regimes in 
Europe and the rest of the world by presenting a comparison of current 
French and British counter-terrorism laws. France and the United 
Kingdom provide good counterpoints for a focused, structured 
comparison. Both previously adopted the sort of specific comprehensive 
counter-terrorism legislation that the European Council called for in the 
wake of 9/11;13 the legal traditions of both countries evolved from liberal 
 
 
 11. See generally Laura Donohue, Criminal Law: Anglo-American Privacy and Surveillance, 96 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1059 (2006); see also, e.g., Adam Tomkins, Legislating Against Terror: 
the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, 2002 PUB. L. 205, 205–07 (2002).  
 12. Muslim minorities comprise approximately five to nine percent of the population of France, 
six percent of the Dutch population, nearly four percent of the German population, and just under three 
percent of the population in the United Kingdom. Leiken, supra note 5, at 5.  
 13. Jan Wouters & Frederik Naert, Of Arrest Warrants, Terrorist Offences and Extradition 
Deals: An Appraisal of the EU’s Main Criminal Law Measures Against Terrorism After “11 
September,” 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 909, 929 n.128 (2004). For more information on post-9/11 
European Council measures pertaining to terrorism, including the European Arrest Warrant, the 
definition of “terrorism,” specific criminal offenses, financial controls, and Joint Investigation Teams, 
see generally Mar Jimeno-Bulnes, After September 11th: The Fight Against Terrorism in National and 
European Law. Substantive and Procedural Rules: Some Examples, 10 EUR. L.J. 235 (2004); Sionaidh 
Douglas-Scott, The Rule of Law in the European Union–Putting the Security into the “Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice,” 29 EUR. L. REV. 219 (2004). For information concerning the 
relationship between the legislation of individual member states and the European Council and 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss2/3
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democratic customs that guard the individual from unwarranted state 
interference.14 And, as documented above, both countries have 
connections to recent militant Islamicist terrorist activities. In addition, 
while security scholars and professionals have long praised France’s 
counter-terrorism regime as being one of the most encompassing and 
effective in the world, they have derided the failings of the United 
Kingdom’s regime, both prior to and following the 2005 London attacks.15 
Part I compares the counter-terrorism laws of France and the United 
Kingdom, touching briefly on their implementation. It demonstrates that 
those states’ regimes are quite similar and points to the conclusion that any 
substantial difference in effectiveness between them has more to do with 
implementation than legislation. Part II discusses possible reasons for any 
such significant difference in implementation.  
I. COUNTER-TERRORISM LAWS IN FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
France’s legal regime for countering terrorism centers on the terrorism 
laws of September 9, 1986, July 10, 1991, July 22, 1996, November 15, 
2001, and March 18, 2003, and on the articles of the Penal and Criminal 
Procedure Codes relating to terrorism.16 The 1986, 1991, and 1996 laws 
were enacted, in large part, in response to the activities of international 
terrorist groups relating to France’s past and present relationships with 
North Africa. In contrast, the 2001 and 2003 laws were passed in reaction 
to 9/11, and they focused on improving terrorism prevention measures.17  
 
 
Common Positions and Framework Decisions, see generally CHRIS VINCENZI & JOHN FAIRHURST, 
LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (3d ed. 2002).  
 14. Dirk Haubrich, Anti-Terror Laws and Civil Liberties: Britain, France and Germany 
Compared, 38 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 3 (2003).  
 15. See, e.g., Islamic Extremism Hearing, supra note 2, at 8–9 (statement of Peter Bergen); John 
Diamond & Matt Kelley, Islamic Radicals Can Find Nest in Nations of Europe, USA TODAY, July 10, 
2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-07-10-europe-terror_x.htm; Leiken, 
supra note 3, at 130; Stephen Ulph, Londonistan, TERRORISM MONITOR, Feb. 25, 2004, at 1, available 
at http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/uploads/ter_002_004.pdf; Islamic Extremism Hearing, 
supra note 2, at 28–29 (prepared statement of Lorenzo Vidino).  
 16. Law No. 86-1020 of Sept. 9, 1986, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] 
[Official Gazette of France], Sept. 10, 1986, p. 10956; Law No. 91-646 of July 10, 1991, Journal 
Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 13, 1991, p. 9167; Law 
No. 96-647 of July 22, 1996, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of 
France], July 23, 1996, p. 11104; Law No. 2001-1062 of Nov. 15, 2001, Journal Officiel de la 
République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Nov. 16, 2001, p. 18215; Law No. 2003-239 
of Mar. 18, 2003, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 
19, 2003, p. 4761; CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art. 421 (Fr.); CODE DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE [C. PR. PÉN.] art. 
706 (Fr.).  
 17. See Stephanie Dagron, Country Report on France, in TERRORISM AS A CHALLENGE FOR 
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: SECURITY VERSUS LIBERTY? 267, 268–79 (Christian Walter et 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The United Kingdom’s counter-terrorism legal regime is centered on 
the Terrorism Act of 2000 (“TA 2000”), Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act of 2001 (“ATCSA”), Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2005 
(“POTA”), and Terrorism Act of 2006 (“TA 2006”).18 The TA 2000 was 
the first permanent counter-terrorism legislation the British Parliament 
passed and was, in large measure, a response to the revelation that young 
Muslims from Pakistani enclaves in the United Kingdom were recruited to 
fight against Indian forces in Kashmir.19 The ATCSA was enacted in 
reaction to 9/11, while the POTA was passed to replace ATCSA 
provisions concerning the detention of foreigners. Following the London 
bombings, Parliament enacted TA 2006, which was directed at 
criminalizing the encouragement of terrorism and expanding the powers of 
arrest and detention with respect to terrorist offenses.20  
As a general matter, France classifies an offense as a “terrorist offense” 
if it contains a terror intent element—if an “individual or collective 
undertaking” is “intentionally” designed “to cause a serious disturbance to 
public order by means of intimidation or terror.”21 As such, if one of the 
many ordinary offenses listed in article 421-1 of the Penal Code, such as 
kidnapping, property destruction, or money laundering, is carried out with 
the requisite terror intent element, that ordinary offense is considered a 
terrorist offense, and the perpetrator is tried according to special terrorism 
protocols and sentencing guidelines.22 France has also defined new 
terrorism-specific offenses, namely environmental terrorism and 
membership in a terrorist group; however, the number of such terrorism-
specific offenses is few. The vast majority of terrorist offenses are 
classified as such using the “terror intent” element approach.23  
The United Kingdom, rejecting the recommendation of the Lloyd 
Commission, which was created to report on the need for permanent 
counter-terrorism legislation in the United Kingdom, chose not to 
subscribe to a terror element approach for classifying which offenses are 
 
 
al. eds., 2004); Kevin A. O’Brien, France, in EUROPE CONFRONTS TERRORISM 19, 20–25 (Karin von 
Hippel ed., 2005).  
 18. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11 (Eng.); Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24 
(Eng.); Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2 (Eng.); Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11 (Eng.).  
 19. See Rainer Grote, Country Report on the United Kingdom, in TERRORISM AS A CHALLENGE 
FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: SECURITY VERSUS LIBERTY? 591, 592–97 (Christian 
Walter et al. eds., 2004); PAULY, JR., supra note 6, at 115.  
 20. See David Bonner, Managing Terrorism While Respecting Human Rights? European Aspects 
of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001, EUR. PUB. L. 8:4, 497, 497–502 (2002); Paul 
Cornish, The United Kingdom, in EUROPE CONFRONTS TERRORISM, supra note 17, at 146, 154–56; 
Grote, supra note 19; PAULY, JR., supra note 6, at 115; Tomkins, supra note 11, at 205–14.  
 21. Dagron, supra note 17, at 268–69.  
 22. Id. at 268–70.  
 23. Id. at 270. 
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terrorist offenses.24 Instead, ordinary crimes are prosecuted as such, while 
certain offenses are deemed terrorist offenses because they are specifically 
enumerated as being so, such as directing a terrorist organization or 
inciting terrorism abroad.25  
The counter-terrorism regimes of France and the United Kingdom are 
examined below. The laws of each country are separated, primarily for 
discussion’s sake, into three categories: immigration and asylum 
measures, preventive measures, and repressive measures. While some laws 
extend into more than one category, the classification structure can still be 
useful.  
A. Immigration and Asylum Measures 
Immigration and asylum laws can have an obvious impact on the threat 
foreigners involved in terrorism pose. While illegal entry is a major 
concern for European states, most actual and would-be foreign terrorist 
attackers have entered Europe legally.26 Notable also is that the European 
Union (EU) has yet to harmonize immigration and asylum measures 
across member states,27 despite the fact that the Schengen Agreement 
provides foreigners with access to all EU countries once they have secured 
entry into any one member state.28 Immigration and asylum laws remain 
the prerogative of individual member states.  
In France, the entry of foreigners is subject to generally applicable 
legislation or to texts specifically applicable to asylum seekers and 
refugees. In either case, in accordance with the Ordonnance of November 
2, 1945, “administrative authorities may refuse entry to a foreigner,” even 
one in possession of required documentation, “suspected of or already 
representing a threat to national security or public order.”29 
Article 13 of the Law of July 25, 1952, requires asylum seekers to 
demonstrate that living in their countries of origin constitutes a threat to 
their lives, liberties, or would subject them to torture or other inhuman 
treatment or punishment.30 The Minister of the Interior, in consultation 
 
 
 24. Grote, supra note 19, at 609–10.  
 25. See Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, §§ 54, 56 (Eng.).  
 26. A study by the Nixon Center for Immigration Studies examined 373 suspected or convicted 
terrorists who resided in or crossed national borders in Western Europe and North America since 1993. 
The study found that only six percent of the sample had entered countries illegally. Leiken, supra note 
5, at 11.  
 27. Gisbert Brinkmann, The Immigration and Asylum Agenda, 10 EUR. L.J., 182, 197 (2004).  
 28. See generally Kees Groenendijk, Reinstatement of Controls at the Internal Borders of 
Europe: Why and Against Whom?, 10 EUR. L.J., 150 (2004).  
 29. Dagron, supra note 17, at 303–04.  
 30. Id. at 303–05.  
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with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, decides whether to grant a request for 
asylum.31 Such requests may be denied if an applicant represents a threat 
to public order or if his or her admission into France would not be 
compatible with the interests of the State.32 The Minister of the Interior 
has complete discretion and need not justify those asylum decisions.33 In a 
concerted effort to prevent militant Islamicists from proselytizing to or 
radicalizing France’s mostly North African Muslim population, France 
adopted a policy, during the 1990s, of denying asylum to Arab and Middle 
Eastern radical Islamicists even when France’s neighbors welcomed 
them.34 
The Law of July 25, 1952, also governs France’s conferment of refugee 
status. In conformance with that law, status must be granted “to all persons 
persecuted for their actions in favor of freedom, to persons protected by 
the High Commissioner for Refugees and to persons whose status is in 
conformity with the definitions of the term ‘refugee’ according to the 1951 
Refugee Convention.”35 However, pursuant to article 1(f) of the Refugee 
Convention, persons “connected with the preparation or commission of 
terrorist acts” anywhere may not be granted the status of a “refugee.”36 
French authorities may strip foreign residents of their legal authority to 
reside in France. The administrative authorities may refuse renewal of a 
residency permit granted for a period of a year,37 if the presence of a 
foreign resident subject to such renewal is determined a threat to public 
order.38 Furthermore, all foreign residents may be expelled from France if 
they “constitute a serious threat to the public order or where it is 
absolutely necessary for State safety or public security.”39 However, both 
French and international law, which prohibit people from being removed 
to countries where they would face persecution, limit expulsion.40  
Despite the existence of such potential limitations on deportation, 
French authorities have aggressively availed themselves of the expulsion 
option. The former U.K. Minister of State for Europe, Denis MacShane, 
speaking on that subject, stated, “In France there is a long tradition of 
political exile, but on condition that people who accept asylum do not use 
 
 
 31. Id. at 304.  
 32. Id. at 304–05.  
 33. Id. at 305.  
 34. Leiken, supra note 3, at 130.  
 35. Dagron, supra note 17, at 305.  
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 306. 
 40. Id. 
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French territory to propagate hate campaigns.”41 That sentiment has led to 
the deportation of two alleged fundamentalist imams and the Algerian 
imam Abdelkader Bouziane after he publicly defended wife beating and 
stoning adulterous women.42 With regard to the expulsion of radical and 
militant Islamicists, former French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin 
has explained that “[u]nder the cover of religion, individuals present on 
our soil have been using extremist language and issuing calls for 
violence . . . these favor the installation of terrorist movements. It is 
necessary therefore to oppose this together and by all available means.”43  
U.K. authorities, like their French counterparts, may not grant refugee 
status to persons connected with the preparation or commission of acts of 
terrorism. Further, in accordance with the ATCSA, authorities may deny 
asylum requests solely on the basis that applicants are not entitled to 
refugee status.44 An asylum appeal begins by considering the statements in 
the Secretary of State’s certificate denying application of the Refugee 
Convention.45 Unlike France, however, the Secretary’s decisions on such 
matters may be appealed to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission 
(SIAC), and where a certificate is revoked, appeal may be sought on a 
point of law.46  
Both before and after the passage of the ATCSA, U.K. authorities 
adhered to a liberal asylum policy. This led French-Algerian journalist 
Mohammed Sifaoui to comment that “the most sought-after terrorists in 
the world have found shelter in the UK . . . [t]hey propagate their ideology 
there [and] . . . Islamists considered the UK as a secondary base for their 
actions.”47 The French have mockingly labeled the United Kingdom’s 
capital city “Londonistan” and “l’antechambre de l’Afghanistan.”48  
The United Kingdom, like France, reserves the authority to expel 
foreign residents who have engaged in terrorist activities. However, given 
that militant Islamicists, such as clerics Abu Hamza, Abu Qatada, and 
Omar Bakri Mohammed, were able to operate openly for years without 
being deported, it seems that U.K. authorities, unlike their French 
 
 
 41. Focus: The Crackdown in the Fight Against Terrorism, OBSERVER, Aug. 7, 2005, at 14, 
available at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/focus/story/0,6903,1544134,00.html. 
 42. Peter Ford, France Tries to Soften Local Style of Islam, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 6, 
2004, at 1, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0506/p01s04-woeu.html.  
 43. Id.  
 44. See Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, §§ 33(1)–(2) (Eng.).  
 45. Id. § 33(3).  
 46. Id. §§ 33(3)–(9).  
 47. Jamie Campbell, Why Terrorists Love Britain, NEW STATESMAN, Aug. 9, 2004, available at 
http://www.newstatesman.com/200408090012. 
 48.  John Kampfner, Why the French Call Us Londonistan, NEW STATESMAN, Dec. 9, 2002, at 
A1, available at 2002 WL 5238232; Ulph, supra note 15, at 1.  
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counterparts, hesitated to remove foreign residents suspected of terrorist-
related activities.49 Under the Immigration Act of 1971, the Secretary of 
State may issue deportation orders against foreign residents if he or she 
deems removal to be in the interest of national security or “conducive to 
the public good.”50 In accordance with the POTA, the Secretary may issue 
control orders against foreign nationals, prohibiting or restricting their 
entrance or presence within the United Kingdom, if considered “necessary 
for purposes connected with preventing or restricting involvement by 
[those] individual[s] in terrorism-related activit[ies].”51  
“Terrorism-related activity” includes “the commission, preparation or 
instigation of acts of terrorism” and conduct that facilitates or encourages 
the commission of such acts.52 The TA 2000 defines terrorism as the use 
or threat of action “designed to influence the government or an 
international governmental organization or to intimidate the public . . . for 
the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause,” 
including serious violence against others or endangering lives, serious 
damage to property, serious risk to health or safety of the public, or actions 
designed to seriously disrupt an electronic system.53 The Secretary’s order 
of deportation on national security grounds may be appealed to the SIAC, 
 
 
 49. Abu Hamza was granted refuge in the United Kingdom in 1979 after fighting with the 
mujahideen in Afghanistan. He led the Finsbury Park Mosque in London until the British government 
shut it down in 2003. While at the Mosque, he openly advocated the use of terrorism, recruited and 
raised funds for militant Islamicist terror groups, and advised Moussaoui, Reid, and eight British 
Muslims caught plotting terrorist attacks in Yemen in 1998. See Islamic Extremism Hearing, supra 
note 2, at 9 (statement of Peter Bergen); EVAN F. KOHLMANN, AL-QAIDA’S JIHAD IN EUROPE: THE 
AFGHAN-BOSNIAN NETWORK 189–90 (2004); Dominic Casciani Profile: Abu Hamza, BBC NEWS, 
Feb. 7, 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4644960.stm (last visited Oct. 3, 2007).  
 Abu Qatada, described as a key figure in an Al-Qaeda related terrorist activity, was granted 
refugee status in the United Kingdom in 1994. Since that time, Jordan convicted him of terrorist 
activities in absentia. After being held in Belmarsh prison for two years, Qatada was released on bail 
and now faces extradition to Jordan. See Profile: Abu Qatada, BBC NEWS, May 5, 2006, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4141594.stm (last visited Oct. 3, 2007).  
 Omar Bakri was granted asylum in the United Kingdom in 1985 after being deported from Saudi 
Arabia for espousing his radical views. In 1997, Bakri established al Muhajiroun (the Migrant’s 
Movement), which subsequently became the most visible radical Islamicist group in the United 
Kingdom with branches in thirty cities and towns. Before being barred from re-entering the United 
Kingdom in August 2005, Bakri openly referred to acts of terror as heroic, including the attacks on the 
U.S. embassies in Africa and the USS Cole. Bakri also had ties to two British Muslims who carried out 
a suicide bombing at Mike’s Place in Tel Aviv, and was alleged to have raised funds and recruited 
individuals for militant Islamicist terrorist activities. See Islamic Extremism Hearing, supra note 2, at 9 
(statement of Peter Bergen); see generally QUINTAN WIKTOROWICZ, RADICAL ISLAM RISING: MUSLIM 
EXTREMISM IN THE WEST 6–10, 72–76 (2005); Kevin Sullivan, Under New Guidelines, Britain will 
Deport Terror Supporters, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2005, at A15.  
 50. Immigration Act, 1971, c.77, §§ 3, 5 (Eng.).  
 51. See Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2, §§ 1(3), 1(4)(g) (Eng.).  
 52. Id. § 1(9).  
 53. Id. § 15(1); see Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 1 (Eng.). 
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and with leave, further appealed to an appropriate appeals court; control 
orders may be appealed to the High Court.54 Deportations resulting from 
such orders are, as in France, limited to the extent that they would result in 
foreign nationals being sent to countries where they would face torture or 
inhuman treatment.55  
The POTA control order scheme resembles the exclusion order system 
applied in Northern Ireland from 1974 to 1998 under successive 
Prevention of Terrorism Acts. It was designed to replace the ATCSA 
provisions that, in 2004, the House of Lords held contravened the 
ECHR.56 Those now-repealed ATCSA provisions allowed for the 
indefinite detention of foreign nationals the Home Secretary certified as 
terrorism-related national security threats when deportation was not 
permitted due to concerns over torture and inhuman treatment by the 
receiving state.57 Rather than permit the indefinite detention of such 
persons without trial, the POTA authorizes the Home Secretary to issue 
control orders circumscribing their movement, the most restrictive of 
which the High Court must approve.58 The POTA makes the violation of a 
control order a prosecutable offense.59 
It appears that French and British laws grant authorities roughly 
equivalent powers to deny entry to asylum and refuge seekers and to expel 
foreign residents who represent terrorist threats. However, it seems that 
U.K. authorities have historically adhered to more liberal entry policies 
than French authorities concerning asylum claimants, refuge seekers, and 
general international visitors, and that the British have more docilely 
pursued the deportation of radical and militant Islamicists.  
B. Preventive Measures 
Preventive laws can help states counter and prepare for the threats that 
terrorists pose. Preventive measures include those concerning the 
proscription of terrorist organizations, searches, the collection and sharing 
 
 
 54. See Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2, § 10 (Eng.); Special Immigration Appeals 
Commission Act, 1997, c. 68, §§ 2, 7 (Eng.).  
 55. See Grote, supra note 19, at 620.  
 56. A and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 
68 (H.L.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldjudgmt/jd041216/a& 
others.pdf; David Bonner, Checking the Executive? Detention Without Trial, Control Orders, Due 
Process and Human Rights, 12 EUR. PUB. L., 45, 60–62 (2006). 
 57. See Mary Arden, Human Rights in the Age of Terrorism, 121 L.Q. REV. 604, 605–10 (2005); 
Brice Dickson, Law Versus Terrorism: Can Law Win?, 1 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 11, 19–25 (2005).  
 58. See Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2, §§ 1–4. Under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 
control orders may be extremely restrictive, limiting a person’s access to his or her residence or other 
specified location and restricting a person’s associations with others. See id. § 1.  
 59. Id. § 9.  
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of information, the enhancement of security at particular points, and the 
suppression of terrorist groups’ financial activities.  
In France, the government may proscribe groups concerned with 
supporting, planning, or conducting terrorist activities. Article 3 of the 
Law of July 15, 1901, allows administrative authorities to obtain judicial 
orders to shut down associations if they are incompatible with public order 
or accepted standards of behavior. Such decisions on the part of French 
authorities do not require associations to have previously committed 
illegal acts; the law is preventative in that sense.60 The French President, 
under the Law of January 10, 1936, and the Law of September 9, 1986, 
may also shut down groups or arrangements that call for armed 
demonstrations in the streets, advocate racial violence, or exist for the 
purpose of preparing terrorist attacks in France or abroad.61 Such a 
Presidential decree was used to dissolve the group Unite Radicale in 
2002.62 
The TA 2000 grants the British Home Secretary powers of proscription 
similar to those available to executive authorities in France. The Home 
Secretary has broad discretion to proscribe groups that the Secretary 
believes are concerned with committing acts of terrorism, and in 
preparing, promoting, or encouraging terrorism.63 The TA 2000 also 
makes it a crime to belong or to profess to belong to a proscribed 
organization, to invite support or to arrange meetings for a proscribed 
organization, or to wear items of clothing or articles typical of a proscribed 
organization.64 To prevent proscribed organizations from avoiding 
proscription by changing their names, the TA 2006 allows the Home 
Secretary to amend the list of proscribed organizations immediately to 
reflect any such name changes.65 Proscribed organizations may appeal 
their proscription to the Proscribed Organizations Appeal Commission 
and, if warranted, the Court of Appeal.66  
In periods of elevated terror threat, the French government may 
institute the Vigipirate plan. Conceived in 1978 during the wave of far-left 
terrorism associated with the Red Army Faction and Red Brigades, 
Vigipirate mobilizes law enforcement, customs, intelligence agencies, and 
 
 
 60. See Dagron, supra note 17, at 289.  
 61. See Law No. 2003-239 of Mar. 18, 2003, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] 
[Official Gazette of France], Mar. 19, 2003, p. 4787; Dagron, supra note 17, at 289–90 (discussing the 
Law on Paramilitary Groups of January 10, 1936). 
 62. Dagron, supra note 17, at 290.  
 63. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 3 (Eng.).  
 64. Id. §§ 11–13.  
 65. Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 22 (Eng.).  
 66. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, §§ 5–6 (Eng.).  
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the military, if necessary, to enhance the security of sensitive points and 
networks, such as nuclear plants, major industrial installations, highways, 
and train stations.67 Vigipirate may be implemented in a range of forms 
along an intensity/breadth continuum; an elevated form has been in place 
since September 12, 2001.68  
In its current form, Vigipirate allows authorities to conduct bag and 
body searches and limited forms of inquiry at designated public places, 
and to extend such search power to private security firms and national rail 
service employees.69 The Vigipirate plan also grants the procureur de la 
Republique the power to authorize the judicial police—the law 
enforcement division tasked with assisting the judiciary—to search 
vehicles in public areas where no criminal offense is being perpetrated, so 
long as such searches are tied to an investigation relating to terrorism.70 
Moreover, under Vigipirate, the judicial police may search a vehicle in a 
public area without authorization from the procureur de la Republique if 
“plausible grounds” exist to suspect persons inside the vehicle of 
attempting, having attempted, or having already carried out a criminal 
offense.71 With respect to biological and nuclear materials, Vigipirate 
enhances security at facilities involved in the production, storage, and 
transport of hazardous biological agents, redefines conditions for the 
handling, possessing, and transferring of poisonous substances, and 
restricts access to, surveillance of, and flights over nuclear facilities.72 
U.K. authorities, similar to their French counterparts, have broad 
security enhancing powers designed to prevent terrorism, though on a 
 
 
 67. O’Brien, supra note 17, at 25–26. In France, with respect to law enforcement, terrorism is the 
primary responsibility of the Groupe d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN), which is 
most active in non-urban areas, and the Recherche, Assistance, Intervention et Dissuasion, which is 
most active in urban areas. With respect to intelligence, the lead agencies concerned with terrorism are 
the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire, which is primarily responsible for counter-terrorist 
activities in France, the Renseignements Generaux (DCRG), which collects intelligence on groups, and 
the Generale de la Securite Exterieure (DGSE), France’s foreign intelligence agency. The Unite de 
Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste (UCLAT) oversees and coordinates the counter-terrorism 
efforts of those agencies and organizations. Id. at 29–30; PETER CHALK & WILLIAM ROSENAU, 
CONFRONTING THE “ENEMY WITHIN” 17–23 (2004).  
 68. O’Brien, supra note 17, at 26–27. As originally conceived, the Vigipirate plan could be 
implemented in Simple or Renforce mode. As of March 2003, the plan was further stratified into 
phased levels of alertness, juane, orange, rouge, and ecarlate. On September 12, 2001, the Vigipirate 
Renforce was implemented, and since March 2003, the plan has alternated between its orange and 
rouge levels. Id.  
 69. Haubrich, supra note 14, at 11–13.  
 70. Dagron, supra note 17, at 285; Law No. 2003-239 of Mar. 18, 2003, Journal Officiel de la 
République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 19, 2003, arts. 12, 13.  
 71. Dagron, supra note 17, at 285. 
 72. Id. at 283–84.  
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permanent rather than specially instituted basis.73 British police may arrest 
and search persons, without warrants, if they have reasonable grounds for 
suspecting those persons have been or are involved in committing, 
preparing, or instigating terrorist acts.74 Further, even if lacking reasonable 
grounds, the police, immigration authorities, and customs officers may 
stop, question, and detain persons traveling to, from, or within the United 
Kingdom to determine whether they have been involved in committing, 
preparing, or instigating terrorist acts.75  
In the United Kingdom, senior police officials may also authorize 
additional search powers, including the stopping and searching of 
pedestrians, vehicles, and vehicle occupants, for use in designated 
geographic areas if they deem such measures expedient for the prevention 
of terrorist activities. Such authorizations may remain in force for a period 
of twenty-eight days, may be renewed, and are subject to Home Office 
confirmation within forty-eight hours of their being issued.76 Senior police 
officials may authorize the prohibition of parking in certain areas if they 
consider doing so “expedient for the prevention of acts of terrorism.”77  
With regard to toxic substances, hazardous biological materials, and 
the nuclear energy industry, the ATCSA introduced a range of new 
security measures in the United Kingdom similar to those Vigipirate puts 
in place in France.78 They include: allowing the police to request 
information about persons who have access to dangerous chemical and 
biological substances; obliging occupiers of facilities holding chemical 
and biological materials to implement security improvements that the 
police recommend; and restricting the sharing of information related to 
nuclear sites.79 
Several laws give French authorities the ability to collect and share 
information concerning individuals and groups suspected of having ties to 
terrorism. The Law of July 10, 1991, authorizes the Prime Minister, at the 
 
 
 73. In the United Kingdom, with respect to law enforcement, terrorism is the primary 
responsibility of the Metropolitan Police Department’s Special Branch (MPSB) and the forty-three 
provincial Special Branches that it helps oversee and coordinate. With respect to intelligence efforts 
concerning terrorism, the Security Service, MI5, is responsible for internal intelligence and counter-
terrorism activities. The Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, the United Kingdom’s foreign intelligence 
service, and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), which intercepts and codes 
communications, also contribute to counter-terrorism efforts. Ordinarily, MI6 and GCHQ coordinate 
with MI5 and the MPSB interface directly. CHALK & ROSENAU, supra note 67, at 7–15.  
 74. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, §§ 40–43 (Eng.). 
 75. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, § 118 (Eng.); Terrorism Act, 2000, 
c. 11 (Eng.).  
 76. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, §§ 44–46 (Eng.).  
 77. Id. § 48.  
 78. See Grote, supra note 19, at 606–09. 
 79. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, §§ 61–63, 79–80 (Eng.).  
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request of the Ministers of the Interior, Defense, and Economy, Finance, 
and Industry, to order the interception of private communications issued, 
transmitted, or received via telecommunication.80 The Prime Minister may 
only give an interception order if he believes such communications bear 
on national security or the prevention of terrorism or organized crime; he 
must, along with the three requesting ministers, present a reasoned 
decision to that end in writing.81  
The current Vigipirate plan also allows authorities to require internet 
providers to store and make available client contact information, and to 
disclose encryption keys so that digital information can be deciphered; 
such information can be shared without the knowledge of the individual 
being monitored.82 The Law of March 18, 2003, authorizes the 
gendarmerie and the judicial police to survey personal files, apart from any 
criminal record, contained in police data-processing systems. In addition, 
the Law of March 18, 2003, allows administrative authorities to obtain 
access to such files when considering whether to bestow French 
citizenship or grant residency extensions.83 Concerning the collection of 
genetic information, article 29 of the Law of March 18, 2003, permits 
French law enforcement authorities to obtain, from persons who have 
committed or are suspected of having committed felonious crimes, genetic 
data for retention in the national files of genetic information.84 
The ATCSA provides British authorities with information collection 
and sharing capabilities comparable to those that French authorities 
possess. In accordance with the ATCSA, communications providers, such 
as telephone and internet companies, may be required to retain information 
concerning their customers—that is, who they contact, when, and from 
where—and to make such information available to law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies.85 The ATCSA gives the Home Secretary broad 
discretion to determine the specific aspects of any such communications 
retention requirements.86  
 
 
 80. Law No. 91-646 of July 10, 1991, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official 
Gazette of France], July 13, 1991, p. 9167; see Dagron, supra note 17, at 285–86.  
 81. Law No. 91-646 of July 10, 1991, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official 
Gazette of France], July 13, 1991, arts. 3, 4. 
 82. Law No. 2001-1062 of Nov. 15, 2001, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] 
[Official Gazette of France], Nov. 16, 2001, arts. 29, 20; see Haubrich, supra note 14, at 11–12. 
 83. See Law No. 2003-239 of Mar. 18, 2003, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] 
[Official Gazette of France], Mar. 19, 2003, arts. 21, 24; Dagron, supra note 17, at 287–88.  
 84. See CODE DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE [C. PR. PÉN.] art. 706-55 (Fr.); Dagron, supra note 17, at 
287.  
 85. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, §§ 101–104 (Eng.); Grote, supra note 
19, at 617–18.  
 86. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, §§ 101–104 (Eng.). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 255 Fisher book pages.doc 10/12/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
270 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 6:255 
 
 
 
Under the ATCSA, administrative authorities may also share any 
personal information they have with one another for the purposes of any 
criminal investigation.87 This includes disclosures of the customs and 
inland revenue services to intelligence agencies.88 The only requirement 
limiting such sharing of personal information is that the disclosing 
authority must be satisfied that the disclosure is proportionate to what is 
sought to be achieved by it.89 Once such information has been made 
available, there appears to be little control over its use for purposes 
unrelated to the precipitating criminal investigation or holding this 
information in some sort of law-enforcement databank.90 
Another goal of France’s counter-terrorism laws is the suppression of 
financial activities that support terrorism. Those involved in transactions 
must adhere to reporting requirements, which provide the central 
mechanism for French authorities to monitor and suppress financial 
activities tied to terrorism. Banks, notaries, attorneys, jewelers, real estate 
brokers, auditors, and persons engaged in like professions, as well as 
casino operators and persons who regularly engage in trade involving 
precious stones and works of art, are required to report suspicious 
transactions that might be linked to terrorist activities to the French 
Financial Intelligence Unit (“TRACFIN”).91 Individuals to whom that 
suspicious transactions reporting model does not apply and who carry out, 
monitor, or provide advice concerning movements of capital must report 
operations relating to criminal activities, including terrorism, of which 
they have knowledge to the procureur de la Republique.92 Additionally, 
all persons transferring funds, securities, or other financial instruments 
with a conversion value of 7,600 euros or more into or out of France, 
without employing an intermediary, such as a credit institution or service 
organization, must file a declaration with customs.93 Once a report to 
TRACFIN or the procureur is made or a customs declaration is filed, 
authorities rely on arrests, seizures, and prosecutions, if they determine 
such treatment is warranted, to prevent the proceeds of such a transaction 
from being used to finance the activities of terrorists.94  
Legislation in the United Kingdom gives British authorities powers, not 
unlike those that their French counterparts possess, to curtail financial 
 
 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. § 19.  
 89. Id. § 17.  
 90. Grote, supra note 19, at 617.  
 91. Dagron, supra note 17, at 290–91.  
 92. Id. at 290.  
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 290–91.  
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activities associated with terrorism. U.K. authorities, via judicial order, 
may require financial institutions to provide information on accounts for 
up to ninety days if doing so would aid a terrorism investigation.95 The TA 
2000 and the ATCSA also oblige financial institutions, in general, to 
report knowledge or suspicion of terrorist financing.96 The Treasury may 
freeze the assets of overseas governments and residents that have taken or 
are likely to take action detrimental to the U.K. economy, or that constitute 
a threat to the life or property of a national or resident of the United 
Kingdom.97 Furthermore, police, customs, and immigration officers are 
authorized to seize and seek the forfeiture of cash if there are reasonable 
grounds to suspect the money is intended to be used for the purposes of 
terrorism, the money consists of the resources of proscribed terrorist 
organizations, or the cash represents property obtained through 
terrorism.98  
Counter-terrorism laws in France and the United Kingdom seem to 
provide equivalent powers, more or less, to authorities in those countries 
with respect to preventive measures. However, as was the case with regard 
to immigration and asylum measures, French authorities appear to pursue 
the use of those powers more vigorously than do their British counterparts. 
French authorities have shown a greater willingness to monitor militant 
Islamicists and take preventative steps to counter them. For example, in 
2004, special police units were set up in each of France’s twenty-two 
regions to conduct surveillance on mosques and Muslim bookshops and 
restaurants that militant Islamicists were thought to frequent.99 In contrast, 
British authorities have traditionally been reluctant to involve themselves 
in the activities of religiously affiliated establishments, organizations, and 
institutions.100 That it took four years for the U.K. Home Secretary to 
proscribe the militant Islamicist group al Muhajiroun serves to illustrate 
that point.101  
 
 
 95. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, sched. 2 (Eng.); Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 
11, sched. 6 (Eng.).  
 96. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, sched. 2 (Eng.); Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 
11, §§ 19–22 (Eng.). 
 97. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, § 4 (Eng.). 
 98. Id. sched. 1 
 99. See Ford, supra note 42; Jon Henley, Imams to be Taught French Way of Life, GUARDIAN, 
Dec. 8, 2004, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/france/story/0,11882,1368735,00.html. 
 100. See Islamic Extremism Hearing, supra note 2, at 9–10 (statement of Peter Bergen); id. at 29 
(prepared statement of Lorenzo Vidino).  
 101. Islamic Extremism Hearing, supra note 2, at 9–10 (statement of Peter Bergen). 
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C. Repressive Measures 
Laws concerning repressive measures allow states to deal with those 
individuals who have engaged in or are suspected of having engaged in 
terrorist activities. Repressive measures include those that relate to the 
detention of suspects, investigation of crimes, judicial process, and 
sentencing. 
French and British counter-terrorism laws provide that special 
detention standards apply during the investigation of terrorist offenses. 
French authorities may detain persons suspected of carrying out acts of 
terrorism for at least forty-eight hours without pressing charges. Within an 
initial forty-eight hour period, they may choose to bring detainees before a 
magistrat du siege to seek permission to hold them for an additional forty-
eight hours, without charge.102 Also, under article 63-4 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, persons being held in police custody in France on 
suspicion of committing terrorist offenses are entitled to lawyers, if they 
so request, after seventy-two hours of detention, not twenty hours, as is the 
case with persons being detained for other types of crimes.103  
U.K. authorities, in comparison, may detain persons suspected of being 
involved with terrorist activities, without pressing charges, for an initial 
period of forty-eight hours and may seek judicial authorization to hold 
those suspects for an additional period of up to twenty-eight days.104  
U.K. authorities investigating crimes relating to terrorism may also 
benefit from section 38(B) of the TA 2000. This section makes it a 
criminal offense for persons with information they know or believe might 
be of material assistance in preventing the commission of terrorist acts or 
in securing the apprehension, prosecution, or conviction of other persons 
involved with terrorist activities, not to disclose such information to 
authorities as soon as practicable.105 Failure to comply with this 
affirmative duty is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years.106  
With respect to jurisdiction, French courts maintain, with obvious 
implications for terrorists, universal jurisdiction. French courts may try 
persons having committed any of the offenses the Penal Code recognizes, 
where individuals concerned are in France, irrespective of the geographic 
location of the commission of the offense or the nationalities of the 
 
 
 102. Code de procédure pénale [C. pr. pén.] art. 706-23 (Fr.).  
 103. Code de procédure pénale [C. pr. pén.] art. 63-4 (Fr.).  
 104. Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 23 (Eng.); Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, sched. 8 (Eng.). 
 105. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 38(B) (Eng.).  
 106. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss2/3
p 255 Fisher book pages.doc10/12/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2007] MILITANT ISLAMICIST TERRORISM IN EUROPE 273 
 
 
 
offenders and victims.107 Courts in the United Kingdom do not enjoy such 
broad jurisdiction. British courts may, however, try U.K. nationals and 
foreign residents for the offenses the TA 2000 and the TA 2006 define, as 
well as other select offenses, regardless of where the offenses were 
committed.108 The TA 2000 and the TA 2006 also allow U.K. courts to try 
non-British citizens for certain limited offenses committed outside of the 
United Kingdom.109  
Terrorist offenses warrant a centralized and specialized judicial process 
in France. According to the French Code of Criminal Procedure, the 
procureur de la Republique, the juge d’instruction, the Tribunal 
correctionnel, and the Cour d’assises of Paris must handle acts of 
terrorism; local prosecutors, magistrates, and courts are not permitted to 
do so.110 The French state has opted for such centralization in an effort to 
deal with the complexity and international character of terrorism. 
Magistrates, operating from Paris, may more easily specialize in handling 
terrorist offenses because they have access in one place to all the relevant 
information they might require, and they may exercise their competence 
over France’s entire territory.111 Additionally, a Cour d’assises, comprised 
of professional judges, hears cases involving alleged perpetrators of acts of 
terrorism who are eighteen-years of age or older; normally, a Cour 
d’assises made up of ordinary citizens hears criminal cases.112 The French 
deemed such composition of the Cour d’assises necessary for judging acts 
of terrorism, since terrorism’s complexity makes it difficult for ordinary 
citizens to do so.113 
 
 
 107. CODE DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE [C. PR. PÉN.] art. 689 (Fr.), quoted in Dagron, supra note 17, at 
293–94.  
 108. See Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 17 (Eng.); Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, §§ 63(A)–63(E) 
(Eng.). 
 109. Id.  
 110. CODE DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE [C. PR. PÉN.] art. 706-17 (Fr.); see Dagron, supra note 17, at 
292–93.  
 111. See Dagron, supra note 17, at 293. Intended as nonbiased arbiters, magistrates have fairly 
wide powers to open inquiries, authorize searches, issue subpoenas, and determine what constitutes an 
act of terrorism. CHALK & ROSENAU, supra note 67, at 21. This authority has prompted one security 
scholar to state that “the French legal system provides . . . anti-terrorism magistrates with powers that 
have no equal in Europe [or] the United States.” Islamic Extremism Hearing, supra note 2, at 28 
(prepared statement of Lorenzo Vidino). With respect to the efficiencies and benefits of centralization, 
operating from Paris allows examining magistrates to work more closely with the DST, the DGSE, and 
UCLAT. CHALK & ROSENAU, supra note 67, at 21. Certain examining magistrates are tasked 
exclusively to terrorism cases and specialize further according to specific classes of terrorism, such as 
separatist, ideological, and religious. Id. This combination of authority, centralization, and 
specialization has made several terrorism-focused examining magistrates in France particularly 
effective and well known, such as Jean-Louis Bruguiere and Jean-Francois Ricard. Id.  
 112. CODE DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE [C. PR. PÉN.] art. 706-25 (Fr.); see Dagron, supra note 17, at 
295–96.  
 113. See Dagron, supra note 17, at 296.  
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In the United Kingdom, by comparison, terrorist offenses receive the 
same treatment from the judicial system as other crimes. While the British, 
having crafted counter-terrorism legislation since 2000, considered 
extending the Diplock system applicable to cases concerning terrorism in 
Northern Ireland to England and Wales, they have so far refrained from 
doing so.114 The Diplock system permits courts to sit without juries, while 
maintaining all the powers, authority, and jurisdiction of jury courts. In 
addition, the Diplock system restricts courts’ granting of bail, allows 
judges to draw inferences of guilt from defendants’ silence, and reverses 
the evidentiary burden of proof by placing it on the defendant in several 
circumstances.115  
In France, when otherwise ordinary offenses are classified as terrorist 
offenses due to the intent with which they were carried out, as discussed 
above, courts may apply harsher sentences. In the United Kingdom, where 
the terror intent approach was rejected, no such sentencing scheme exists. 
Where the terror intent element is present, the maximum sentences 
initially available to the French courts are increased as follows: 
imprisonment for thirty years becomes life imprisonment; twenty years in 
prison becomes thirty; fifteen years becomes twenty; ten years becomes 
fifteen; seven years becomes ten; five years becomes seven; and where the 
initial applicable penalty was between one and three years, the penalty 
may be doubled.116 
It appears that French and British counter-terrorism laws provide 
authorities with rather equivalent detention and investigation powers. U.K. 
authorities, in contrast to the patterns they have traditionally exhibited 
with regard to immigration, asylum, and preventive measures, have 
historically been willing to assertively implement the repressive measures 
at their disposal regarding detention and investigation. With respect to 
judicial process and sentencing, France’s counter-terrorism efforts 
doubtlessly benefit from the centralization and specialization that its civil 
law tradition affords, and its terrorism-specific sentencing scheme may act 
as a deterrent and symbolic gesture. That said, it is not clear that the 
current U.K. system for prosecuting and trying terrorism cases is any less 
effective. 
Part I presented a broad comparison of current counter-terrorism laws 
in France and the United Kingdom. Foremost, that comparison revealed 
what those two prominent European countries believe are the elements a 
 
 
 114. See Cornish, supra note 20, at 154–55; Grote, supra note 19, at 615.  
 115. LAURA K. DONOHUE, COUNTER-TERRORIST LAW AND EMERGENCY POWERS IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 1922–2000, 124–25, 129, 193–94 (2001).  
 116. CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art. 421-3 (Fr.); see Dagron, supra note 17, at 296–97. 
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comprehensive counter-terrorism regime should include. The comparison 
also demonstrated that, overall, French and British counter-terrorism laws 
address most of those elements in a similar manner and that they tend to 
provide their countries’ authorities with roughly equivalent powers. That, 
and the apparent hesitation with which U.K. authorities have pursued 
immigration, asylum, and preventive measures, suggest that the views 
security experts take of the relative effectiveness of the French and British 
counter-terrorism regimes must have more to do with the implementation 
of the laws that comprise them than the laws themselves. Part II examines 
possible explanations for any such substantial difference in 
implementation. 
II. DIFFERENCES IN IMPLEMENTATION IN FRANCE AND THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 
U.K. authorities’ seeming reluctance to avail themselves of the powers 
their country’s counter-terrorism laws afford them may have eroded 
entirely in the wake of the 2005 London suicide bombings.117 It is too 
early to tell. Future developments aside, three factors may help explain 
why, in contrast to their French counterparts, U.K. authorities have 
historically appeared hesitate to fully implement counter-terrorism 
legislation, i.e., in developing and pursuing policies, counter-terrorism 
laws reflect: (1) each nation’s recent history, (2) their distinct judicial-
system traditions, (3) the perception of Muslim communities and Muslim 
integration in each country. 
The recent history of terrorist activities in France is long and varied. 
France’s experiences with terrorism prompted it to adopt specific counter-
terrorism legislation in 1986, spurred it to enact additional counter-
terrorism laws subsequently, and have highlighted the relevance and utility 
of those legal measures for French authorities. Separatist organizations 
that engage in terrorism, such as the Basque group Iparretarak and the 
Front de Liberation Nationale de la Corse (“FLNC”), have been active in 
France since the mid 1970s.118 Iparretarak last claimed responsibility for 
terrorist acts in 1998, while the FLNC and its more radical offshoot, 
 
 
 117. See HOME OFFICE, REPORT OF THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE BOMBINGS IN LONDON ON 
7TH JULY 2005, 2005-6, H.C. 1087, available at http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/ 
hc0506/hc10/1087/1087.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2007), for more information confirming and 
discussing such reluctance on the part of U.K. authorities; INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE, 
REPORT INTO THE LONDON TERRORIST ATTACKS ON 7 JULY 2005, 2006, Cm. 6785, available at 
http://www.official-documents. gov.uk/document/cm67/6785/6785.pdf. 
 118. Dagron, supra note 17, at 276–77.  
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Armata Corsa, last claimed responsibility for terrorist attacks in 2002.119 
The radical left group Action Directe carried out many terrorist attacks 
targeting individuals and facilities associated with businesses and the 
military in France between 1979 and 1987.120 Also during that period, the 
Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Front, Hezbollah, several groups linked to 
Palestine, and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia 
conducted terrorist attacks against American, Israeli, and Turkish interests 
in France.121 Most pertinent perhaps to French authorities’ treatment of the 
current terrorism threat militant Islamicists pose, the Algerian militant 
Islamicist organization Groupe Islamique Armfe (“GIA”) carried out a 
series of attacks on the Paris Metro in 1995, which resulted in eight deaths 
and approximately two hundred casualties, and in the Roubaix-Lille region 
in 1996.122 The GIA seeks to end France’s support of the secular, military-
backed Algerian government, which the GIA aims to overthrow, and is 
suspected of operating within France on an ongoing basis.123  
In contrast to the diverse recent history of terrorism in France, the 
United Kingdom’s recent historical experience with terrorism, prior to the 
2005 London bombings, almost exclusively involved groups connected to 
Northern Ireland. These groups included the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army, its offshoots, and the Ulster Defense Association and its 
affiliates.124 Such groups, acting in accordance with the Good Friday 
Agreement, have not perpetrated a significant terrorist attack since 1998. 
British counter-terrorism legislation prior to the TA 2000, reflecting the 
United Kingdom’s narrow experience with terrorism, was specifically 
designed to address terrorist activities tied to Northern Ireland.125 U.K. 
authorities, despite terrorist developments on continental Europe, may 
have not perceived the immediacy of the militant Islamicist terror threat 
and, therefore, may not have pursued the use of their powers under 
counter-terrorism laws as vigorously as they might have otherwise to 
 
 
 119. Id.  
 120. See generally Michael Y. Dartnell, Action Directe: Ultra-Left Terrorism in France, 1979–
1987 (1995).  
 121. Dagron, supra note 17, at 278–79.  
 122. Johnson, supra note 1. Rachid Ramda, a suspect who French authorities wanted in 
connection to the Paris Metro bombings, was arrested and imprisoned in the United Kingdom in 1996 
for his alleged involvement in those attacks but not extradited to France until December 2005. Daniel 
McGrory, Terror Suspect Extradited After 10 Years, TIMESONLINE, Dec. 2, 2005, http://www. 
timesonline.co.uk/article/0,13509-1900234,00.html. 
 123. See Dagron, supra note 17, at 279 n.41; Johnson, supra note 1. Since the Algerian 
government’s decision to cancel the 1992 national election, which the radical Islamist party Islamic 
Salvation Front (FIS) was poised to win, the GIA have acted to oust the Algerian regime and to end 
France’s support for it. PAULY, JR., supra note 6, at 50.  
 124. See generally DONOHUE, supra note 115.  
 125. See Grote, supra note 19, at 592–97.  
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confront militant Islamicists. British authorities’ unfamiliarity with 
operating under new broad counter-terrorism laws applicable outside of 
the Northern Ireland context may have also contributed to their seeming 
hesitation to implement available measures aggressively.  
The different traditions of the judicial systems in France and the United 
Kingdom may explain the apparent variance in those countries’ 
implementation of counter-terrorism laws. The French judicial system 
rests on a civil law tradition that links it to the rest of the state apparatus 
and, as a result, operates with the other branches of the state in a rather 
indivisible manner. That relationship is likely to make the French judicial 
system more accepting of, and less likely to rebuke, the actions of 
executive authorities taken for counter-terrorism purposes.  
In the United Kingdom, by comparison, while there is no written 
constitution and the principle of parliamentary sovereignty is 
entrenched,126 the British judicial system rests on a tradition of 
independence that continues to this day.127 British courts have historically 
sided with the executive branch concerning issues of national security.128 
However, the independence of the courts, combined with their judicial 
review function, may have made British authorities weary of being found 
to have overstepped the bounds of the counter-terrorism laws under which 
they may act. As a result, British authorities may, as discussed above, use 
their powers relating to proscription, deportation, and control orders less 
aggressively than they otherwise might. 
The Human Rights Act of 1998 (“HRA”) increased the ability of 
British courts to review the “constitutionality” of laws and government 
actions by giving individuals the opportunity to argue for their ECHR 
rights in British courts, and by giving British judges the authority to 
adjudicate directly on ECHR issues.129 The HRA may also have added, 
however, to British authorities’ apparent weariness to implement the full 
repertoire of counter-terrorism measures available to them, and perhaps for 
good reason. In A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, the 
House of Lords, acting pursuant to its authority under the HRA, held that 
the ATCSA’s provisions relating to the indefinite detention of foreigners 
were incompatible with the ECHR.130  
 
 
 126. Haubrich, supra note 14, at 24.  
 127. See generally Bonner, supra note 56.  
 128. Id. at 51–52.  
 129. Haubrich, supra note 14, at 24–25.  
 130. A and Others, supra note 56. For an analysis of the holding in A and Others, see Bonner, 
supra note 56, at 53–59; Dickson, supra note 57, at 19–24. 
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Differences in how France and the United Kingdom apparently 
perceive the susceptibility of their Muslim communities to radicalization 
by militant Islamicists and Muslim integration into their respective 
societies may further explain why French and U.K. authorities have 
seemed to implement their respective countries’ counter-terrorism laws 
with differing degrees of intensity. Persons of Algerian descent make up 
approximately forty percent of France’s Muslim population.131 This 
population figure, France’s proximity to Algeria, the two countries’ 
turbulent colonial relationship, and the French government’s support for 
the current Algerian regime can lead to volatility in France. This is 
exemplified in the string of GIA perpetrated terrorist attacks in 1995 and 
1996, several of which French-born members carried out.132 The potential 
for volatility, combined with quickly rising crime rates in France’s 
banlieues (suburban Muslim enclaves) beginning in the mid-1990s and 
continuing to the present,133 seems to have led French authorities to fear 
that militant Islamicists might be able to inspire French Muslims to engage 
in terrorist activities.  
The longstanding French notions that foreigners should integrate as 
individuals, rather than as communities with distinct minority identities, 
and that integration into French society should entail the adoption, at least 
to some degree, of French secularism, may have compounded that 
concern.134 That is, insofar as the resistance of Muslims in France to 
integrate in accordance with those notions has served to buttress the 
mistaken perception that they are a monolithic, fundamentalist community 
that opposes French societal norms.135 Such a perception may have 
prompted French authorities to implement the counter-terrorism laws at 
their disposal in an especially vigorous manner. 
U.K. authorities’ perception of the susceptibility of U.K. Muslims to 
radicalization, which the traditional U.K. integration model reinforced, 
appears to contrast sharply with the view that their French counterparts 
seem to hold of France’s Muslims. Historically, the United Kingdom’s 
wider Muslim population, made up mostly of persons of Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi descent, had not demonstrated a propensity to adopt radical 
 
 
 131. PAULY, JR., supra note 6, at 38.  
 132. KOHLMANN, supra note 49, at 188–98.  
 133. PAULY, JR., supra note 6, at 50. Crime in the banlieues now accounts for seventy percent of 
all crime committed in France. Incidents of violent crime increased by 400 percent in the banlieues 
between 1993 and 1997, comparable trends were evident in 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002. French law 
enforcement has classified 400 Muslim neighborhoods as “very dangerous,” a designation that 
signifies prevalent organized crime and possession of firearms. Id.  
 134. See id. at 42–43, 46.  
 135. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss2/3
p 255 Fisher book pages.doc10/12/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2007] MILITANT ISLAMICIST TERRORISM IN EUROPE 279 
 
 
 
Islamicist views or a willingness to engage in terrorist activities.136 Also, 
notwithstanding the involvement of suburban Muslim enclave youth in 
inter-ethnic rioting in the West Midlands and West Yorkshire in 2001, 
crime rates in heavily concentrated Muslim areas were not a cause for 
alarm.137 Those observations seem to have led U.K. authorities to perceive 
the possibility of U.K. Muslims taking part in terrorism as remote.138  
The United Kingdom’s “separate multiculturalism” model of 
integration, which, in stark opposition to French assimilationism, accepts 
and supports the coexistence of distinctive minority communities, may 
have reinforced that view.139 Separate multiculturalism would anticipate 
that radical and militant Islamicists, mostly from Arab and North African 
countries, would not be able to connect with and, therefore, would not be 
able to radicalize the United Kingdom’s mostly Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
Muslims.140 Furthermore, that integration model seems to have led U.K. 
authorities to take a somewhat hands-off approach with respect to radical 
and militant Islamicists operating in the broader U.K. Muslim community. 
According to an implicit understanding that has been termed the “covenant 
of security,” British authorities would not interfere with radical and 
militant Islamicists, even those known to have been involved with terrorist 
activities elsewhere, so long as they did not conduct acts of terrorism 
within the United Kingdom.141 These perceptions, concerning the 
susceptibility of U.K. Muslims to radicalization and integration that U.K. 
authorities appear to have held, may have contributed to the lack of 
intensity with which U.K. authorities seemed to implement the counter-
terrorism measures available to them.142 
Part II discussed three differences between France and the United 
Kingdom that may help explain why the authorities in those countries took 
seemingly dissimilar approaches to implementing counter-terrorism 
legislation. These differences include different historical experiences with 
terrorism, judicial-system traditions, and perceptions of domestic Muslim 
 
 
 136. See generally Richard Barltrop, Muslims in Europe, Post 9/11: Understanding and 
Responding to the Islamic World (2003).  
 137. See PAULY, JR., supra note 6, at 98–115.  
 138. HOME OFFICE, supra note 117; INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE, supra note 117.  
 139. PAULY, JR., supra note 6, at 110–11.  
 140. See BARLTROP, supra note 136.  
 141. See Kampfner, supra note 48; Sandra Laville, Banned Groups with Roots in UK Appeal to 
Disaffected Young Muslims, GUARDIAN, Aug. 6, 2005, at 4, available at http://politics.guardian.co.uk/ 
terrorism/story/0,15935,1543732,00.html; Sean O’Neill, Islamic Cleric Declared War on Britain Six 
Months Ago, TIMESONLINE, July 12, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,22989-1690461,00. 
html; Daniel Pipes, British “Covenant of Security” with Islamists Ends, NEW YORK SUN, July 8, 2005, 
at 6, available at http://www.danielpipes.org/article/2742.  
 142. See generally HOME OFFICE, supra note 117; INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE, 
supra note 117. 
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populations and integration. For these reasons, French authorities 
implemented counter-terrorism laws aggressively whereas U.K. authorities 
implemented laws in a fashion lacking comparable urgency and vigor.  
CONCLUSION 
Europe faces a considerable threat from militant Islamicist terrorists. 
As such, it is vital that European states have legal regimes in place that 
will allow them to counter terrorism actively and effectively. It is also 
crucial that those regimes balance the need for security with the principle 
of freedom. As an initial step in advancing the development of effective 
and balanced counter-terrorism regimes, this article presented a broad 
comparison of the counter-terrorism laws of two prominent European 
countries with long liberal-democratic traditions, France and the United 
Kingdom. The comparison between France and the United Kingdom 
demonstrates that those states believe a comprehensive counter-terrorism 
regime should encompass a range of elements, including entry, 
deportation, proscription, arrest, search, detention, the securitization of 
sensitive areas and dangerous substances, the collection and sharing of 
information, financing, investigation, judicial process, and sentencing. 
Furthermore, it showed that French and U.K. counter-terrorism laws 
address most of those elements in a similar fashion and that, generally, 
they provide their countries’ authorities with rather equivalent powers. 
This article also endeavored to explain why, given the comparability of 
French and U.K. counter-terrorism laws, security scholars and 
professionals have tended to praise France’s counter-terrorism regime but 
criticize the United Kingdom’s. French and U.K. authorities’ differing 
approaches to implementing their respective countries’ counter-terrorism 
legislation lies at the center of that question. Recent historical experience, 
judicial-system tradition, and perceptions of domestic Muslim populations 
and integration appear to have led French authorities to pursue an 
aggressive approach. In contrast, those factors seem to have led U.K. 
authorities, at least prior to the 2005 London bombings, to pursue 
restrained implementation of their country’s counter-terrorism laws. We 
see how countries’ different social histories and traditions can affect the 
impact of similarly constructed laws designed to address the same issue.  
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